The BBC reports that Vladimir Putin has told U.S. President Donald Trump that he will have to respond to Ukraine’s major drone attack, codenamed Spider’s Web, on Russian airbases.
Speaking after a phone call with the Russian president, Trump said: “President Putin did say, and very strongly, that he will have to respond to the recent attack on the airfields.”
Russian officials declined to confirm this on Wednesday night, but Moscow had earlier said that military options were “on the table” for its response.
Trump warned in a social media post that the phone call, which lasted more than an hour, would not “lead to immediate peace” between Russia and Ukraine.
The Russian has telegraphed his punch, which seems so odd as to almost be contrived. Putin, like a movie villain, gave a speech before actually firing his shot at his supposedly cornered enemy, who in the meantime may find a way to preempt him.
It seems what Putin is actually telling Trump is that they must let him recover some face if the West still hopes to salvage a ceasefire and he hopes the Western counter-counter strike should not be too severe. He wants revenge without escalation.
But Trump is not promising anything. He appears to be saying, “I’ll pass the message along, though Zelensky doesn’t always listen.” In other words, “I’ve done what I can do for peace and if you guys still want war then get it out of your system.” There is an appetite for war that has not yet been sated.
The fear now is that Putin, in his wrath, may retaliate with tactical nukes. But that begs the question of why they have not been used by Russia so far. The answer lies in risk. The uncertain course of the Ukraine war has given Kyiv a probabilistic nuclear deterrent. Putin’s inability to control outcomes implies that if he uses nukes, whatever his intent, then events may take an unpredictable course and there’s a chance it will spread to Russia.
Nothing has gone according to plan, so there is no guarantee a limited use of nukes will go to plan either. Too much can go wrong. Ukraine’s proximity to Europe means that Russia cannot treat Kyiv like an isolated nonnuclear power. Like Hamas, Ukraine it is standing too close to collateral damage to hit with the big bomb. The result is risk no one so far has been willing to take.
But if nukes are effectively off the table, what form can victory take? From Russia’s POV it probably remains capturing Ukraine as far as Kyiv, perhaps as far West as Lviv. But for weaker Kyiv the goal may be simpler. Victory is not marching into Moscow but toppling Putin.
Ironically Putin seems to have accepted Zelensky’s premise that he is the center of gravity of Ukraine’s war efforts, and that makes peace hard to negotiate. An acceptable peace from Putin’s POV is not necessarily the one which is in Russia’s best interests but the one which makes him look good; one which guarantees his political and personal survival.
This means Ukrainian operations like Operation Spider’s Web have a two edged effect. If they are successful they make Putin look bad and paradoxically induce him to dig his heels in harder because he’ll not agree to a peace deal that does not portray him as the victor.
This is the game both belligerents are determined to play and they will resist Trump’s “peace is in your mutual interest” offer until one side wins or they give up trying. Yet a cynic (some might prefer a realist) might ask, why should Washington not abet it? What should US policy be concerning a never-ending war with Russia?
There are probably two schools in Washington about such a prospect. The first is happy to watch Russia and Ukraine bleed the other dry. The second fears war as an uncontrollable phenomenon that may one day spread to the world. In the short run the former is probable, but in the long run the latter is certain.
Consider a game with a 95% chance of winning, each time collecting a billion dollars yet with a 5% chance of losing that results in the death of all the players. A bold man might play but never for too long, lest the Ace of Spades appear, which will eventually occur. The rational thing to do is quit at some point, but both Putin and Zelensky are desperate men and will play far longer than nonbelligerents who would rather the killing and destruction stop now.
In the coming days Putin will have his revenge, but it will not be as free from the risk of escalation as he hopes. In November 1937 Winston Churchill observed in a letter: “dictators ride to and fro upon tigers which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry.” In less than two years the great Englishman would prove prescient. No one could get off the tiger until until 1945. Churchill himself is long gone, but the tiger alas remains.
