Is that true? On American college campuses and in Big Apple mayoral primaries, Hamas seems to be thriving. In Gaza, however, the end may be nigh.
Yesterday, an unnamed Hamas security officer painted a grim picture about the status of the terrorist network for the BBC. Leaderless, disconnected, and just about out of ammo, the remnants of Hamas don’t have many options left. In fact, this insider expects Israel to now finish the job, since there aren’t many reasons for them to let up:
“Let’s be realistic here – there’s barely anything left of the security structure. Most of the leadership, about 95%, are now dead… The active figures have all been killed,” he said. “So really, what’s stopping Israel from continuing this war?”
“Logically, it has to continue until the end. All the conditions are aligned: Israel has the upper hand, the world is silent, the Arab regimes are silent, criminal gangs are everywhere, society is collapsing.” …
“About the security situation, let me be clear: it has completely collapsed. Totally gone. There’s no control anywhere,” he said.
“People looted the most powerful Hamas security apparatus (Ansar), the complex which Hamas used to rule Gaza.
“They looted everything, the offices – mattresses, even zinc panels – and no-one intervened. No police, no security.”
That may well be true, but it doesn’t necessarily equate to the end of Hamas in Gaza. The problem is that there aren’t any competing structures arising in Gaza for policing or security, except the IDF in limited areas. If fighting stopped tomorrow, the remnants of Hamas would still have a near-monopoly on force in the territory apart from the IDF and could assert control again in short order. New leaders would arise, although the short-term prospects would likely tend toward an internecine fight among them for control of the Hamas gangs, the status to which they have been reduced.
If that’s the case, then why not take a deal to release the hostages in exchange for safe passage to exile? The main problem with that may be the collapse described by the BBC’s source. If the hostages are dispersed — and that has been the case until now — the leadership in Doha may not be able to deliver them. The factions among the remnants may not cooperate, or at least some of them may not, which would complicate any exchanges. As things stand, if any do capitulate for exile, the other factions might turn on them and create even more chaos. That is a big question at the moment hanging over the talks: do the dilettante billionaires of Hamas in Doha speak for anyone now, and do they have any real authority over the remnants of their organization?
The real alternative in Gaza may already be ascending. Clans are beginning to take control in areas occupied by the IDF, which Israeli is apparently encouraging. That has some risks — some of the clans have ties to radical Islamists, although whether those are practical or ideological remains to be seen. It’s still a better option than direct occupation by Israel, which everyone wants to avoid if possible, and it also would legitimize any security arrangements on the ground with the local populace. It fits better within traditional Arab society, plus provides some subsidiarity that allows Israel to keep any potential uprisings less centralized. But right now, Hamas still controls most of the arms in Gaza, even in its remnant state, and clan control is limited to the Israeli security cordons at the moment. Only a total Hamas collapse will allow for that model to expand, which is the reason Israel does not want to end the war until Hamas is completely destroyed.
Hamas may not be the only Palestinian org suffering from the gigantic backfire of October 7. The alternative in Gaza — control by the clans in traditional Arab fashion — may also become the norm in the West Bank. The sheikhs of Hebron have called for an end to the Oslo Accord structure that put the PLO in charge of the West Bank, and have pledged to recognize Israel as a Jewish state in exchange:
“We want cooperation with Israel,” says Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari, also known as Abu Sanad, from his ceremonial tent in Hebron, the West Bank’s largest city located south of Jerusalem. “We want coexistence.” The leader of Hebron’s most influential clan has said such things before, as did his father. But this time is different. Sheikh Jaabari and four other leading Hebron sheikhs have signed a letter pledging peace and full recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Their plan is for Hebron to break out of the Palestinian Authority, establish an emirate of its own, and join the Abraham Accords.
The letter is addressed to Israeli Economy Minister Nir Barkat, a former mayor of Jerusalem, who has brought Mr. Jaabari and other sheikhs to his home and met with them more than a dozen times since February. They ask him to present it to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and await his reply.
“The Emirate of Hebron shall recognize the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people,” the sheikhs write, “and the State of Israel shall recognize the Emirate of Hebron as the Representative of the Arab residents in the Hebron District.” Accepting Israel as a Jewish state goes further than the Palestinian Authority ever has, and sweeps aside decades of rejectionism.
The letter seeks a timetable for negotiations to join the Abraham Accords and “a fair and decent arrangement that would replace the Oslo Accords, which only brought damage, death, economic disaster and destruction.” The Oslo Accords, agreed to by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1990s, “have brought upon us the corrupt Palestinian Authority, instead of recognizing the traditional, authentic local leadership.” That would be the clans, the great families that still shape Palestinian society.
The Israelis will like this idea — a lot. It allows them to separate the various clans into their own emirates, deal with each individually, and contain any future conflicts that may arise. It also would allow Israel to finally dispense with Fatah as well as Hamas, which has been less deadly of late but largely just as uncooperative. It will also allow Israel to claim West Bank settlements as more fully legitimate, and if Fatah doesn’t like it, they may not be able to do much about it while clans claim emirates within their areas of control. The only question is whether the Saudis and the other Sunni Arab partners in the Abraham Accords will go along with it. They have firmly stuck to demands for Palestinian statehood, and a piecemeal approach like this may not go down too well in Riyadh and Amman. Or Damascus for that matter, since the new regime in Syria may soon join that pact too.
This much is certain, however: Hamas will have delivered a much-changed region in the Middle East as a result of their October 7 massacres. They have destroyed Iranian hegemony, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, possibly Hezbollah and its grip on Lebanon, and may take down the ridiculously corrupt and malicious Palestinian Authority along with it. And not least, themselves.
